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Does Productivity Respond to Exchange Rate Appreciations?





Although real currency appreciations pose direct diﬃculties for exporters and
import-competing ﬁrms as they will face more intense competition, is it possible that
such competition spurs ﬁrms to improve productivity? To answer this question, the
paper ﬁrst constructs a theoretical model to show how the competitive pressures of
currency appreciations induce ﬁrms to improve productivity by adopting new tech-
nologies. In addition, the model predicts that during appreciations there will be
a positive relation between market concentration and improvements in productivity
for industries highly exposed to trade, because the marginal beneﬁts of productivity
improvement will be bigger for ﬁrms with a larger market share. The paper then
examines Canadian manufacturing data from 1997 to 2006, and ﬁnds evidence consis-
tent with model predictions. I ﬁnd that growth rates of labor productivity were on
average higher during the Canadian dollar appreciation between 2002 and 2006, after
controlling for industry characteristics. Within the group of highly traded Canadian
industries, the more concentrated ones experienced larger growth in labor productivity.
JEL Classiﬁcation: F3, F4
Keywords: exchange rate appreciation, productivity, technology adoption.
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1 Introduction
Substantial exchange rate movements over the last few decades have raised a question:
what are the impacts of a major real exchange rate appreciation on economic perfor-
mance? Conventional wisdom suggests that such appreciation worsens terms of trade
and weakens the competitiveness of home ﬁrms. Meanwhile, the possibility remains that
to maintain competitiveness, ﬁrms will be forced to raise productivity by reducing their
costs. Some scholars and economic commentators argue that a “hard currency”, meaning
a currency less prone to depreciation, can contribute to higher productivity growth. For
instance, (Porter, 1990, p.640) suggests that the appreciations of the Yen in the 1980s had
spurred the Japanese industry to become more competitive. Harris (2001) argues that
the Canadian dollar depreciation in the 1990s was partially responsible for the Canadian
productivity decline.
To answer the question of whether manufacturing productivity responds to real ap-
preciations, I ﬁrst construct a model in which currency appreciations can provide incentives
for ﬁrms to improve productivity if they are in industries highly exposed to trade. The
model also predicts that among highly traded industries, the highly concentrated ones will
invest more in productivity improvements since the marginal beneﬁts of productivity gain
will be greater for ﬁrms with a larger market share. Second, I test the predictions empiri-
cally by using Canadian manufacturing data from 1997 to 2006. The results suggest that
manufacturing productivity growth responded positively to the appreciation of the Cana-
dian dollar between 2002 and 2006. Within industries exposed to a substantial amount of
trade, the highly concentrated ones experienced a larger gain in labor productivity during
the appreciation period.
In a neoclassical framework, proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms automatically implies cost
minimization. However, some economists have long argued that product market compe-
tition forces ﬁrms to lower costs and thus improve productivity. Nickell (1996) contains a
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review of earlier contributions along this line of thinking. Some of the theoretical models
are based on contract theory, for example Hart (1983) and Raith (2003). Vives (2008)
examines a wide variety of industrial organization models, and concludes that, in general,
increased competition encourages product and process innovations. Holmes, Levine and
Schmitz (2008) provide a simple setup to explain the positive relation between competi-
tion and adoption of new technology, based on the empirical observation that technology
changes are often disruptive in the sense that the transition to higher productivity often
features initially higher marginal costs.
This paper adapts the Holmes et al. (2008) assumption of disruptive technological
change to clarify the eﬀect of increased competition due to real exchange rate appreciations
on productivity. In the model, one of the costs of adopting a cost-reducing technology is
proﬁt loss due to a temporarily high marginal cost of production during the transition.
When the exchange rate appreciates, there is less proﬁt to be made, and so proﬁt loss due
to adopting new technology is also smaller. However, if ﬁrms in an industry are shielded
by high trade costs, then their proﬁtability is less inﬂuenced by appreciations, and the
incentive to improve productivity provided by appreciations is smaller.
Compared to Holmes et al. (2008) and other previous papers which focus on when
ﬁrms are likely to adopt new technologies to improve productivity, this paper also studies
what types of ﬁrms are likely to invest more in productivity improvement. The model
predicts ﬁrms will invest to achieve bigger productivity gain if they are in industries with
a low trade cost and a high level of concentration. In industries with fewer ﬁrms, since
the marginal beneﬁts of productivity improvements are greater, ﬁrms in these industries
are likely to invest more in productivity improvements.
There are a number of studies that provide evidence of a positive correlation be-
tween competition and productivity improvement, with competitive pressure measured as
the number of competitors, concentration ratio, trade barriers, or the eﬀect of competi-
3
tion policy. MacDonald (1994) ﬁnds that import competition improved productivity in
highly concentrated US industries. Nickell (1996) suggests that an increase in the number
of competitors was associated with total factor productivity (TFP) gain in a sample of
700 ﬁrms in the UK. Symeonidis (2008) exploits the variation arising from the introduc-
tion of anti-cartel laws in UK industries, and ﬁnds that collusion reduced industry-level
productivity growth. Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2002) and Syverson (2004) are two
papers that focus on individual industries. The former paper investigates Canadian and
American iron ore producers, which doubled labor productivity, and increased material
eﬃciency by 50% in response to intense price competition from Brazilian ﬁrms. The latter
paper examines ready-mixed concrete plants in the US, and ﬁnds that an increase in local
competition led to higher average productivity and lower productivity dispersion.
A few recent ﬁrm-level studies examine the eﬀect of exchange rate appreciation on
ﬁrm performances. Fung (2008) examines the productivity responses of Taiwanese ﬁrms
to a major currency appreciation and ﬁnds productivity gain mainly due to the exit of less
eﬃcient ﬁrms and bigger production scale of surviving ﬁrms after the appreciation. Using
a micro data set from Norway, Ekholm, Moxnes and Ulltveit-Moe (2008) ﬁnd that net-
exporting manufacturing ﬁrms experienced productivity gain after the appreciation of the
Norwegian Krone in the early 2000s. They argue that the gain in productivity came from
technological improvement, and employment cuts. Baggs, Beaulieu and Fung (2009) study
the relation between ﬁrm performances and exchange rate in Canada between 1986 and
1997. They suggest that an appreciation decreased sales, proﬁtability and survival rate,
while a depreciation strengthened them. Studying the Canadian agricultural implements
industry, Tomlin (2010) also reports evidence that an appreciation reduces the survival
probability of plants, especially the less productive ones.
To test the predictions of the theoretical model, this paper use data on 237 Cana-
dian manufacturing industries between 1997 and 2006 to study how industry-level labor
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productivity growth interacts with exchange rate movements, concentration, and trade
costs. The Canadian dollar experienced substantial movements in the period, allowing
me to investigate the productivity response to a major appreciation. I ﬁnd that growth
rates of labor productivity, measured as value added per production worker, were on av-
erage higher during the Canadian dollar appreciation between 2002 and 2006. Within
the industries with a high trade-to-revenue ratio, the highly concentrated ones experi-
enced greater growth in labor productivity. The empirical analysis controls for energy
use growth, material use growth, R&D expenditure growth, productivity growth in corre-
sponding US industries, industry ﬁxed eﬀects, and year ﬁxed eﬀects. My empirical work,
based on industry-level data, complements the ﬁrm-level studies by building a model that
links industry features to the size of productivity gain, and providing supporting evidence.
Relative to the aforementioned papers, this paper makes two contributions. Theo-
retically, it studies whether ﬁrms will improve productivity by adopting new technologies
to counter the eﬀect of appreciations, and what type of ﬁrms will invest more in new
technologies. Empirically, the estimates in this paper suggest the productivity responses
of highly-traded and concentrated Canadian manufacturing industries to the Canadian
dollar appreciation between 2002 and 2006 were positive and signiﬁcant.
The next section lays out the basic modeling environment. Section 3 introduces
the technological opportunity for home ﬁrms to improve productivity, and examines how
home ﬁrms’ choices interact with an appreciation. Section 4 tests the model predictions
on Canadian manufacturing data and section 5 concludes.
2 Basic Model Setup
There are two countries, the home (h) and the foreign (f), and each has a representative
household. The two households have the same given wealth 푊 and consume a continuum
of goods indexed by 푖 with 푖 ∈ [0, 1]. labor supplies in both countries are perfectly inelastic.
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Following the convention in international economics, the superscript ∗ denotes variables in
the foreign country. The household preferences determine the demand functions for good









where 푊/(1 + 훽) is normalized to be 1.
For each good 푖, there are 푛푖 home ﬁrms and 푛푖 foreign ﬁrms who can produce it. I
will refer to these ﬁrms as ﬁrms in industry 푖. In both periods, all home ﬁrms are endowed
with a constant marginal cost of 푐푖ℎ푡 = 푐ℎ unit of labor and the foreign ﬁrms are endowed
with a constant marginal cost of 푐푖푓푡 = 푐푓 . Thus in the model, home and foreign labor
productivities in any industry are 1푐ℎ and
1
푐푓
. labor is the only input and is not mobile
across countries. Every good is tradable, subject to an iceberg trade cost 휏푖 for good 푖,
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meaning that for each 휏푖 unit of good 푖 shipped to the other country only one unit will
arrive. 휏푖 and 푛푖 are drawn from the joint CDF 퐹 (휏, 푛) with support [1,∞)× [1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 푛].
1
The market structure within each industry is similar to that found in Brander and
Krugman (1983). The home ﬁrms and foreign ﬁrms of industry 푖 produce using labor in
their respective countries. However, they are free to sell their production in both countries.
For a given period, the home and foreign ﬁrms of industry 푖 play a Cournot game in the
home market to determine the quantities of good 푖 produced by each ﬁrm for the home
market. Simultaneously, the same ﬁrms also compete in a Cournot game in the foreign
market. As mentioned before, in all periods both the home and foreign ﬁrm face an iceberg
trade cost 휏푖 when they sell in the non-native market. Figure 2.1 illustrates the market
structure.



















where 푥푗푖ℎ1 and 푥
푗∗
푖ℎ1 are the quantities it produces for home and foreign markets in period
1, and 푥푗푖ℎ2 and 푥
푗∗
푖ℎ2 are the quantities for home and foreign markets in period 2. 휋
푗
푖ℎ1 and




푖ℎ2 are proﬁts from
the foreign market, measured in the foreign currency. 푒1 and 푒2 are the real exchange
rates in the two periods. They are deﬁned as the price of one unit of real foreign money
balance in terms of real home money balance, so a decrease in 푒푡 is a real appreciation of
the home currency.
The exchange rates are determined exogenously and known to all ﬁrms at the begin-
ning of period 1. This assumption may appear surprising for economists familiar with the
macroeconomic models of exchange rate determination. However, given that my interests
are on the eﬀect of exchange change rate on ﬁrms’ behavior and that the macroeconomic
1In this model, the number of ﬁrms in an industry is exogenously given. This treatment can be viewed
as a simpliﬁcation of the case where ﬁrms can enter and exit an industry freely and the number of ﬁrms
in equilibrium is determined by the exogenous ﬁxed cost of entry.
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models of exchange rate have enjoyed limited empirical success, I argue that treating the
exchange rate as exogenous is appropriate in this paper.2
In setting up the ﬁrm’s problem, I assume ﬁrms will discount future at the rate of
time preference of the household, who is also the owner of the ﬁrms. In reality, ﬁrms
may diﬀer in the discount factor. For ﬁrms who place little value on future, there is very
little incentive for them to adopt a technology that will bring a future beneﬁt, holding
other factors constant. The objective function also features no expectation operator, as I
assume ﬁrms have perfect foresight of future. While expectation plays an important role
in decision, I choose to suppress it here so as to focus discussion on how exchange rate
lowers opportunity cost of adopting new technology. On empirical section, it is argued
that ﬁrms in Canada have a good idea about the path of exchange rate since appreciations
tend to be persistent and commodity prices are a good forecaster of exchange rate of the
Canadian dollar.
At the beginning of period 1 all ﬁrms observe each other’s marginal costs for all
times. Then all ﬁrms in industry 푖 play a game to determine quantities of output in the
four markets (home and foreign markets in period 1 and 2). The strategy of home ﬁrm 푗 in










, and the strategy of foreign ﬁrm 푗










. There are four subgames, one
for each market in each period. I focus on the subgame perfect equilibrium in which ﬁrms
in industry 푖 of each country play symmetric strategies. I assume ﬁrms have to determine
simultaneously the quantities in both markets in a period, hence in each period, the two
subgames for the two markets are independent. In period 2, ﬁrms have to play a Nash
equilibrium in the subgames. By the standard backward induction principle, they will
also have to play a Nash equilibrium in the subgames in period 1. Thus all four subgames
are independent, so the subgame perfect equilibrium involves ﬁrms playing the symmetric
2In Tang (2008), I endogenize the exchange rate and the income of the households in a theoretical model
and ﬁnd that ﬁrms have incentive to improve productivity when the exchange rate appreciates.
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Nash equilibrium in each subgame. The output quantities in each subgame are determined
as the symmetric Nash equilibrium quantities in that subgame. We can calculate in the
maximized total proﬁt as the sum of maximized proﬁts from each subgame.
Normalizing home wage to be 1, the proﬁt of the home ﬁrm 푗 of industry 푖 in the
home market at time 푡 is














where 푥푘푖ℎ푡 and 푥
푘
푖푓푡 are the quantities of good 푖 produced by home ﬁrm 푘 and foreign
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푖ℎ푡 to maximize


















− 푐ℎ ≤ 0 (7)
Similarly the proﬁt of foreign ﬁrm 푗 of industry 푖 in the home market at time 푡 is
































− 푒푡휏푖푐푓 ≤ 0. (9)
(7) and (9) implicitly deﬁne the best responses functions of the home 푗 and foreign
ﬁrm 푗 to quantities produced by other ﬁrms. Combining (7) and (9) and imposing symme-
try among all home ﬁrms and symmetry among all foreign ﬁrms, we have the equilibrium
relation between outputs of home and foreign ﬁrms
푥푗푖푓푡 =
푛푖푐ℎ − (푛푖 − 1)푒푡휏푖푐푓
푛푖푒푡휏푖푐푓 − (푛푖 − 1)푐ℎ
푥푗푖ℎ푡 = 훼1(푡, 푖)푥
푗
푖ℎ푡 (10)
where 훼1(푡, 푖) =
푛푖푐ℎ−(푛푖−1)푒푡휏푖푐푓
푛푖푒푡휏푖푐푓−(푛푖−1)푐ℎ
. A careful examination of (7) suggests that if 푐ℎ is large,
then the home ﬁrms will produce zero quantities, and foreign ﬁrms will produce large
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quantities. This is because foreign ﬁrms know that given the quantities they produced,
home ﬁrms’ the marginal revenue in the home market (the ﬁrst term in (7)) is always less
than the marginal cost for all 푥푗푖ℎ푡 ≥ 0, leading the home ﬁrms to optimally choose zero
quantities. In this case, the denominator of 훼1 will be negative and (10) will no longer
describe the relation between home and foreign quantities of output. Similarly when 푒푡휏푖푐푓
is large, foreign ﬁrms will produce zero quantities, and the numerator of 훼1(푡, 푖) will be
negative. It can be shown that the necessary conditions for both home and foreign ﬁrms to
produce positive quantities in the home market is that both numerator and denominator
















If (11) is satisﬁed, we can substitute the last expression into (7) and (9) and solve for 푥푗푖ℎ푡
and 푥푗푖푓푡
푥푗푖ℎ푡 =
푛푖 − 1 + 푛푖훼1(푡, 푖)
(푛푖 + 푛푖훼1(푡, 푖))2푐ℎ
(12)
푥푗푖푓푡 =
푛푖 − 1 + 푛푖/훼1(푡, 푖)
(푛푖 + 푛푖/훼1(푡, 푖))2푒푡휏푖푐푓
(13)















If we substitute (12) and (13) into (6) and (8), we have
휋푗푖ℎ푡 =
1




(푛푖 + 푛푖/훼1(푡, 푖))2
(17)
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Thus for industry 푖 we have a unique symmetric equilibrium in the home market under
(11).
Similarly the home ﬁrm’s and foreign ﬁrm’s proﬁt functions in the foreign market,



































In a symmetric equilibrium in which ﬁrms of both countries produce positive quantities,
the equilibrium output and proﬁts are given by
푥푗∗푖ℎ푡 =
푛푖 − 1 + 푛푖훼2(푡, 푖)
(푛푖 + 푛푖훼2(푡, 푖))2푐ℎ
(18)
푥∗푖푓푡 =
푛푖 − 1 + 푛푖/훼2(푡, 푖)








(푛푖 + 푛푖/훼2(푡, 푖))2
(21)
where 훼2(푡, 푖) =
푛푖휏푖푐ℎ−(푛푖−1)푒푡푐푓
푛푖푒푡푐푓−(푛푖−1)휏푖푐ℎ
. The necessary condition for both home and foreign ﬁrms














Given 푐ℎ, 푐푓 and 푒푡, (11) and (22) imply that in industries in the set































both home and foreign ﬁrms will produce positive quantities in both markets at time 푡.
I use the notation Θ(푒푡) to emphasize the set depends on 푒푡. Empirically, an industry in
Θ(푒푡) is one that has both positive import and export. For these industries, total proﬁts
for home and foreign ﬁrms are given by
Π푗푖ℎ =
1
(푛푖 + 푛푖훼1(푡 = 1, 푖))2
+
푒1
(푛푖 + 푛푖훼2(푡 = 1, 푖))2
+
훽
(푛푖 + 푛푖훼1(푡 = 2, 푖))2
+
훽푒2
(푛푖 + 푛푖훼2(푡 = 2, 푖))2
Π푗푖푓 =
1
푒1(푛푖 + 푛푖/훼1(푡 = 1, 푖))2
+
1
(푛푖 + 푛푖/훼2(푡 = 1, 푖))2
+
훽
푒2(푛푖 + 푛푖/훼1(푡 = 2, 푖))2
+
훽
(푛푖 + 푛푖/훼2(푡 = 2, 푖))2
. (24)
Proposition 1. (a) For industries in the set Θ(푒푡), the period 푡 proﬁt of home ﬁrm 푗 in
industry 푖 is a decreasing function of 푐ℎ and an increasing function of exchange rate 푒푡.
(b) For industries with the same 휏푖 in the set Θ(푒푡), the period 푡 proﬁt for home ﬁrms 푗
is decreasing in 푛푖. (c) For industries with the same 휏푖 and in which only home ﬁrms are
producing positive quantities, the period 푡 proﬁt for home ﬁrms 푗 is decreasing in 푛푖.
Proof:
(a) From (16) and (21), we can see the period 푡 proﬁt of home ﬁrm 푗 in industry 푖 is
decreasing in 훼1 and 훼2. Since both 훼1 and 훼2 are increasing in 푐ℎ and decreasing in 푒푡,
the conclusion follows.




(푛푖 + 푛푖훼1(푡, 푖))2
(16)






is increasing in 푛푖.






decreasing in 푛푖. Lastly, when 푐ℎ < 푒푡휏푖푐푓 , we can prove 휋
푗
푖ℎ푡 is decreasing in 푛푖 by showing
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the derivative of the numerator of (16) with respect to 푛푖 is positive.
∂
∂푛푖








− 푛2푖 + 푛푖
푒푡휏푖푐푓
푒푡휏푖푐푓−푐ℎ








+ 푛푖 − 1)2
> 0
Therefore, we have shown that 휋푗푖ℎ푡 is always decreasing in 푛푖. Similarly, we can show the
period 푡 proﬁt of home ﬁrm 푗 in the foreign market is decreasing in 푛푖.
(c) For industries in which only home ﬁrms are producing positive quantities for







decreasing in 푛푖. ■
The proposition conﬁrms the intuition that an appreciation of home currency erodes
the proﬁt of home ﬁrms and validates the usual Cournot competition result that proﬁt
dissipates with the number of ﬁrms.
3 Exchange Appreciation and Investment Decision
In this section I introduce the possibility of cost-saving technology. The term technology
is deﬁned as in Jones (2001), as ways to transform factors into output. In general, they
can be product innovations, but in this paper I refer to a cost-saving process innovation.
For example the innovation could be an improvement in labor practice as emphasized in
Baily, Gersbach, Scherer and Lichtenberg (1995), and Schmitz (2005).
To simplify the problem, I assume all home and foreign ﬁrms in each industry are
endowed with the same cost, 푐ℎ = 푐 = 푐푓 for both periods. All home ﬁrms have access to
technology that reduces the second-period marginal cost from 푐ℎ to
1
휎 푐ℎ, where 휎 is the
improvement in labor productivity. However the technology is also disruptive in the sense
13
that, if a ﬁrm chooses 휎 > 1, it raises the ﬁrst period marginal cost from 푐ℎ to 훾푐ℎ, where
훾 is a constant greater than 1.3 Since adoption at time 푡 will raise the cost at that period,
no ﬁrm would adopt the innovation at 푡 = 2. Proposition 1 implies the technology will
bring higher proﬁt in the second period but entail a loss of proﬁt in the ﬁrst. Firms can
choose 휎 in the range [1, 휎) but will have to pay a ﬁxed cost 퐼(휎). I assume 퐼(휎) is strictly
convex in 휎 for all 1 < 휎 < 휎, 퐼(휎 = 1) = 0, lim휎→1 퐼(휎) > 0, and lim휎→휎 퐼(휎) =∞.
4
I assume that no foreign ﬁrms have the option to upgrade their technology. The
assumption is made to simplify the interaction between home and foreign ﬁrms regarding
the choice of 휎, which would vary across industries. In Tang (2008), I show that if both
home and foreign ﬁrms can only choose between the status quo (sq), i.e. 휎 = 1, and some
ﬁxed 휎 > 1, then the unique equilibrium is for the home ﬁrms to adopt and foreign ﬁrms
to keep the status quo when there is a large appreciation.5
My assumption regarding new technology follows that of Holmes et al. (2008), which
suggests that technology change is disruptive in the sense that there is a costly transition
to lower cost of production. Holmes et al. (2008) motivate this assumption by citing a
large number of empirical observations. For illustrative purposes consider the following
scenario. The implementation of new technology requires a ﬁxed investment in the training
of employees and during the transition, as a result, workers are less productive as they are
learning to master the new technology. As mentioned in the introduction, Vives (2008)
3It is possible that ﬁrms could improve productivity by adopting other new technologies that are not
disruptive and are always proﬁtable to implement. I choose not to model such technology opportunities
as they would not interact with exchange rate movements. In the empirical section of the paper, I will try
to account for this possibility.
4In general 훾 can be increasing in 휎, however, since the assumptions regarding 퐼(휎) ensure that the
ﬁrst-period cost of adoption (which equals 퐼(휎) plus the proﬁt loss due to a high marginal cost 훾푐ℎ) is
increasing in 휎, I do not pursue this complication.
5In the setting in which both home and foreign ﬁrms can choose 휎 from [1,∞), it is very diﬃcult to
predict the equilibrium outcome in an technology adoption game. It is possible to show that given the
technological choice of foreign ﬁrms, home ﬁrms’ incentive to adopt increases with an appreciation, and
that given the technological choice of home ﬁrms, foreign ﬁrms’ incentive decreases with an appreciation.
Since it appears that foreign ﬁrms’ incentive to improve productivity is weaker with an appreciation, I
assume the extreme case that foreign ﬁrms simply cannot upgrade and focus on how the choices of home
ﬁrms vary with industry characteristics.
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studies a wide variety of industrial organization models and concludes that in general more
competition induces a bigger eﬀort to improve productivity. Holmes et al. (2008) obtain
similar predictions with the empirically motivated assumption of disruptive technology
changes. I follow their assumption to maintain model tractability.
It is clear from the nature of the technology that the trade oﬀ between current costs
and future gain is crucial for adoption choices. A two-period world is the minimum struc-
ture that allows us to study the trade oﬀ between the present and the future. Adding
more periods simply requires one to replace second-period proﬁts in ﬁrms’ objective func-
tions with value functions. Both a second-period proﬁt function and a value function
should be increasing in productivity, giving rise to a future gain due to a technological
upgrade. Since the focus of this paper is on how ﬁrst-period loss interacts with exchange
rate movements, a two-period model is suﬃcient.
Since the two countries are symmetric, it is reasonable to conjecture that without
exogenous shocks, the exchange rate is 푒푡 = 1,
6 will hold in both periods. The timing of
the game in industry 푖 is the following:
∙ Stage 0, an exogenous shock to exchange rate is realized, ﬁrms have perfect foresight
that 푒1 < 1 and 푒2 = 1;
7
∙ Stage 1, home ﬁrm 푗 determines its choices of 휎푗 and pay 퐼(휎푗), for 푗 = 1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 푛푖;
∙ Stage 2, the choices of home ﬁrms in stage 1 are observed by all (so every ﬁrm
knows the marginal cost of each ﬁrm in both periods), and ﬁrms play the Cournot
game as described in section 2 to determine outputs in each of the four markets
(home and foreign markets in period 1 and 2).
6In Tang (2008), I close the model and derive the equilibrium exchange rate as a function of ﬁrm
productivities and shock to currency demand. In a steady state in which the productivities are equal
across countries and currency demand shocks equal zero, the equilibrium exchange rate is 1.
7As indicated by Rogoﬀ (1996) and references therein, the exchange rate tends to revert to the Pur-
chasing Power Parity (PPP) level in the long run. To simplify the analysis, I assume that the ﬁrms know
for sure the exchange rate will return to its long run value of 1 for sure.
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The game is solved by standard backward induction. In stage 2, given
{
휎1, 휎2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 휎푛푖
}
ﬁrms play the Cournot game described in section 2 and the payoﬀs are as derived in section
2. In stage 1, given how the equilibrium proﬁt depends on
{
휎1, 휎2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 휎푛푖
}
, home ﬁrm 푗
chooses 휎푗 , for 푗 = 1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 푛푖. Again, I will focus on a symmetric equilibrium between
home ﬁrms in stage 1.
In stage 2, I focus on the choices of 휎 for industries in which ﬁrms of both countries
produce positive quantities in all markets, except that home ﬁrms may be forced out of
the foreign market during the period 1 appreciation. If all home ﬁrms in industry 푖 choose
the same 휎 > 1, and if ﬁrms of both countries are producing positive quantities then the
































푛 휏푖훾) is an indicator function. When 푒1 >
푛−1
푛 휏푖훾 fails, the home ﬁrms
are driven out of the foreign market, and make zero proﬁt. If all home ﬁrms choose status





























I refer to the diﬀerence Π푗푖ℎ(휎)−Π
푗
푖ℎ(푠푞) as the beneﬁt of adopting the disruptive technol-
ogy. Choosing some 휎 > 1 dominates 휎 = 1, if the associated beneﬁt is greater than the
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Similar to (23), given 푒1 < 1 and 푒2 = 1, we can formally deﬁne the set of industries with
{푛푖, 휏푖, 휎푖} such that ﬁrms of both countries produce positive quantities for all markets,
except that home ﬁrms may produce zero for the foreign market during the period 1 due
to the appreciation, as















In terms of import and export, an industry in Θ휎(푒1) have positive import in both periods,
positive export in the second period and possibly positive export in the ﬁrst period.
To make it possible for the adoption decision problem to interact with the exchange
rate, I assume




푖ℎ(푠푞) < 퐼(휎) for all 휎 ∈ (1, 휎);
∙ (ii) If 휏푖 = 1, for all 푛푖 ∈ [1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 푛] we can ﬁnd an interval Σ푛푖 ⊂ (1, 휎) such that
the second-period proﬁt gain of ﬁrms in industry 푖, given by equation (28), is strictly
greater than the cost 퐼(휎) for all 휎 ∈ Σ푛푖 .
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Assumption (i) implies it is not proﬁtable to choose any 휎 > 1 with 푒1 = 1, and assumption
(ii) says that if the ﬁrst-period proﬁt loss is zero, it will be proﬁtable for home ﬁrms of
industry 푖 to adopt 휎 ∈ Σ푛푖 .
The following two propositions show how beneﬁts in adopting disruptive new tech-
nologies are aﬀected by 푒1 and 휏푖. Firstly given 휏푖 and 푛푖, an exchange appreciation lowers
the ﬁrst period proﬁt loss, so choosing some 휎 > 1 can be proﬁtable. Secondly, given
푒1 and 푛푖, a large trade cost 휏푖 insulates home ﬁrms from trade and the inﬂuence of ex-
change rate movements. Home ﬁrms will have no incentive to choose 휎 > 1, even if they
experience an appreciation.
Proposition 2. Consider industries in Θ휎(푒1). Given 푛푖, and 휏푖 close enough to 1, for
all 휎 ∈ Σ푛푖 there exists an exchange rate threshold such that it is proﬁtable to adopt 휎 for
home ﬁrms for all 푒1 below the threshold.
Proof:
The absolute value of the ﬁrst-period proﬁt loss due to adoption (27) is bounded by the
















As 푒1 tends to
푛푖−1
휏푖푛푖
from above, the ﬁrst-period proﬁt will tend to zero and so will the
ﬁrst-period proﬁt loss due to adoption. By assumption (ii), for industries with 휏푖, the
beneﬁt of adopting 휎 > 1 is greater than the cost for all 휎 ∈ Σ푛푖 . Since the proﬁt
functions are continuous in 휏푖, by assumption (ii) for 휏푖 close enough to 1, the second-
period proﬁt gain of ﬁrms in industry 푖 will be strictly greater than 퐼(휎), i.e. 퐺2 > 퐼(휎),
for all 휎 ∈ Σ푛푖 . Therefore for each 휎 ∈ Σ푛푖 we can ﬁnd an 푒1 such that for all 푒1 < 푒1,
the ﬁrst period loss ∣퐿1∣ < 퐺2 − 퐼(휎). Thus for all 푒1 < 푒1, adopting 휎 ∈ Σ푛푖 is proﬁtable
since Π푗푖 (휎)−Π
푗
푖 (푠푞) = 퐺2 − ∣퐿1∣ > 퐼(휎). ■
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Proposition 3. Given an 푒1 < 1, there exists a threshold 휏ˆ such that adopting the tech-
nology of any level 휎 will not proﬁtable for ﬁrms in any industry with 휏푖 ≥ 휏ˆ , regardless
of the number of ﬁrms in the industry.
Proof:
Consider an industry with 푛 ﬁrms. There are two possibilities. Firstly, given 푒1 adopting
any 휎 ∈ (1, 휎) will not be proﬁtable for all 휏 ∈ [1,∞). In this case, set the threshold to
be 휏ˆ푛 = 1.
Secondly, given 푒1, adopting some 휎 ∈ (1, 휎) will be proﬁtable for some 휏 ∈ [1,∞).
Fix the new technology at a speciﬁc level 휎. Either the technology of level 휎 is not
proﬁtable for all 휏푖, or it is proﬁtable for some level of 휏 . In the former case, set the





, home ﬁrms operate
only in the home market and the foreign ﬁrms’ market share in the home market tends to
zero in both periods.8 The limit of ﬁrm 푗’s total gain (which equals beneﬁt minus cost)













, then all ﬁrms in all 푛-ﬁrm industries with 휏푖 ≥ 휏ˆ푛(휎) will not adopt
the technology of the level 휎. Now, we allow 휎 to vary in the range (1, 휎. Taking the
supremum of 휏ˆ푛(휎) over the range (1, 휎, the threshold for the 푛-ﬁrm industries is 휏ˆ푛 =
sup {휏ˆ푛(휎) : 휎 ∈ (1, 휎)}.
To ﬁnd the trade cost threshold for all possible 푛, we take
휏ˆ = max {휏ˆ푛 : 푛 = 1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 푛}
and the conclusion follows. ■








, then only home ﬁrms will sell in the home
market. If 휏 > 푛
푛−1
푒1 and 휏 >
푛−1
푛
푒1, then only the foreign ﬁrms will sell in the foreign market. Combining




, the home and foreign ﬁrms will only operate in their native









also ensures the home
and foreign ﬁrms will only operate in their native markets in period 2.
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Proposition 3 implies that given an appreciation of a certain magnitude, 휏ˆ will
partition the industries into two sets. The ﬁrst set of industries with low 휏푖 may choose a
new technology of level 휎 > 1 and the second set of ﬁrms will not. The remaining part of
the section examines how home ﬁrms choose 휎. We will see that if the ﬁrst set contains
industries with the same trade cost but the diﬀerent 푛푖, then those with low 푛푖 are likely
to choose a large 휎.
In stage 2 of the game, the ﬁrst-period proﬁt is not dependent on the choice of 휎,
and the equilibrium quantities and proﬁts are similar to section 2. The second-period











































































The ﬁrst order conditions implicitly deﬁne the optimal output 푥푗푖ℎ2 as a function of 휎⃗ =
[휎1, 휎2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 휎푛푖 ]. Denote it as 푥푗푖ℎ2(휎⃗). Similarly we deﬁne the optimal output function in
the foreign market as 푥푗∗푖ℎ2(휎⃗)
In stage 1, home ﬁrm 푗 foresees the equilibrium output functions in the second stage
20



























































= 퐼 ′(휎푗) (32)
Imposing symmetry among home ﬁrms’ choices of 휎, we have 푥푗푖ℎ2(휎⃗) = 푥
푘
푖ℎ2(휎⃗) for all 푘.







































































푛2푖 (1 + 훼2)
2
)]
= 퐼 ′(휎푗) (34)
from which we can solve for the equilibrium 휎푗 .
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Proposition 4. Let 푒1 < 1 and consider industries with the same trade cost 휏 < 휏ˆ in
Θ휎(푒1). If all values of 휎 in some interval in (1, 휎) are proﬁtable for ﬁrms in industries
with diﬀerent 푛푖, then the choice of 휎 is decreasing in 푛푖 for 2 ≤ 푛푖 ≤ 푛.
Proof:











(1푗휎휏푖)(2− 푛푖 − 푛푖훼1)





푗)(2− 푛푖 − 푛푖훼2)
(푛푖 − (푛푖 − 1)휏푖/휎푗)2푛3푖 (1 + 훼
2)2
]
which is negative if 푛푖 ≥ 2. This means the marginal beneﬁt of 휎
푗 is bigger for industries














푗) is a strictly concave function.
Let 푛′ and 푛′′ be the number of ﬁrms in two industries with the same trade cost
휏 < 휏˜ and 2 ≤ 푛′ < 푛′′ ≤ 푛. Denote the ﬁrms’ optimal choices of technology levels as 휎푛′
and 휎푛′′ . Suppose 휎푛′′ ≥ 휎푛′ . Then we have
∂Π푗푖ℎ(휎
















which means the proﬁt for ﬁrm 푗 in the 푛′-ﬁrm industry, Π푗푖ℎ(휎
푗 , 푛푖 = 푛
′) − 퐼(휎푗), is in-
creasing at some level no smaller than 휎푛′ . This increase contradicts that 휎푛′ is the optimal
choice for ﬁrms in the industry with 푛푖 ﬁrms, unless there is another local maximizer 휎
∗
with 휎∗ > 휎푛′ . However, since Π
푗
푖ℎ(휎
푗) is strictly concave and 퐼(휎) is strictly convex, there
are no other local maximizers. Thus we conclude that 휎푛′′ < 휎푛′ for all 2 ≤ 푛
′ ≤ 푛′′ ≤ 푛.
■
Note when 휎 is greater (1 + 1푛푖−1)
1
휏푖
, all foreign ﬁrms in industry 푖 are forced out of
the home market. Given a 휏푖, if 퐼(휎) rises fast enough, then it will exceed the beneﬁt of
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adoption at 휎 = (1 + 1푛−1)
1
휏푖
, ensuring that all home ﬁrms will have interior choices of 휎,
i.e. the foreign ﬁrms will not be out of the home and foreign market. Figure 2.2 illustrates
this point.
The key for the proof is that among industries with the same 휏 , the proﬁt of ﬁrms
in industries with lower 푛푖 is more responsive to 휎. Thus the marginal proﬁt with respect
to 휎 is equal to the marginal cost 퐼 ′(휎) at a bigger value. Figure 2.3 demonstrates the
argument graphically.
Putting Propositions 2, 3 and 4 together yields the following predictions. First,
among industries with trade cost lower than the threshold 휏ˆ there is negative correlation
between the number of ﬁrms per industry and the choice of 휎 if 푛푖 ≥ 2. Since the
concentration level of an industry is inversely related to the number of ﬁrms, if we regress
휎 on concentration for the set of industries with 휏ˆ , OLS is predicted to ﬁnd a positive
relation. Second, industries with trade costs greater than 휏ˆ will not adopt the disruptive
technology. For these industries, a regression of 휎 on concentration will yield a zero slope
coeﬃcient. Figure 2.4 illustrates the adoption choices for ﬁrms in diﬀerent industries.
Overall, if we simply pool all industries together and regress 휎 on concentration, we are
likely to ﬁnd a positive relation.
Compared to Holmes et al. (2008) and other previous theoretical papers which focus
on the question of whether ﬁrms will adopt a new technology when there is more compe-
tition, this paper studies both the conditions for adoption and the intensity of adoption.
The model presented here diﬀerentiates between two types of competition, the competitive
pressure from appreciations, and market concentration. The competitive pressure from
appreciations is predicted to provide an incentive for adopting new technologies, consis-
tent with ﬁnding of previous papers. However, ﬁrms in highly-concentrated industries, i.e.
those subject to less competition in this dimension, are likely to invest more to achieve big-
ger productivity improvements. Thus, my model illustrates that the eﬀect of competition
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on adoption of new technologies is subtle.
While the above model focuses on the interaction between exchange rate apprecia-
tion and the adoption of a disruptive technology, it should be recognized that an important
alternative mechanism can potentially also give rise to similar predictions. That is, when
exchange rate appreciates, foreign capital goods that embody better technology will be-
come cheaper. Although there is no explicit role of capital in my model, this idea of
cheaper investment goods can be modeled by assuming the home ﬁrms purchase the in-
vestment 퐼(휎) from the foreign country. In this case, the home ﬁrm 푗 problem, previously
















It can be showed that Proposition 4 holds under this setup, without making the assumption
of disruptive technology. Such a mechanism will predict increase in purchase of foreign
capital goods. Without access to detail data on the capital investment and intermediate
good trade for Canadian manufacturing industries, I am unable to diﬀerentiate between
the two hypotheses in the empirical section.
4 Manufacturing Productivities in Canada Over the Last
Decade
When the home country experiences an appreciation, the model developed in sections 2 and
3 oﬀers the following two key predictions. First, in general appreciations provide incentives
for ﬁrms to improve productivity. Second, among industries with low trade costs, the
highly concentrated ones will implement bigger improvements to productivity, as proﬁts
of ﬁrms with a bigger market share will be more responsive to change in productivity.
Industries with high trade costs will have no incentive to improve productivity regardless of
the concentration level, as the high trade cost will limit competition from foreign industries.
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In the model I assume that in the country that experiences a depreciation, produc-
tivity will not respond to depreciation. The assumption is needed to simplify the analysis
when industries in the other country are allowed to choose the level of productivity im-
provement. If this assumption is a reasonable approximation of ﬁrms’ behavior during
depreciation, we would see the ﬁrms’ productivity fall relative to their counterparts in the
other countries as the latter group of ﬁrms have an incentive to improve productivity to
counter the movement of the exchange rate.
To test the predictions of the model, I analyze how the productivity of Canadian
manufacturing industries responded between 1997 and 2006 to the interactions between
exchange rate movements, trade costs, and concentrations. There are a few advantages
to using Canadian manufacturing data. First, Canada is a highly open economy, and
its manufacturing industries are exposed to a substantial amount of trade. In particular,
because of the Free Trade Agreement with the US, Canada’s main trading partner, we
may consider the trade costs of Canadian industries reﬂect mostly exogenous factors.
Second, during the sample period the Canadian dollar experienced ﬁrst a moderate
depreciation then a major appreciation. Since there is evidence (see for instance Maier and
DePratto (2007)) that the recent exchange movements are partly driven by movements in
commodity prices, it is reasonable to suggest the movements are exogenous to manufactur-
ing industries. Although productivity of manufacturing industries may contribute to the
movements in exchange rates, such eﬀects are likely to be dominated by the commodity
factor.
Third, since both Canada and the US have adopted the North American Industry
Classiﬁcation System (NAICS), I am able to use productivity growth in the US manufac-
turing industries to control for some of the unobserved industry characteristics. Among
others, this would capture technological spillovers from US industries.
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4.1 Speciﬁcation and Data
The sample used in this study involves the annual data of 237 6-digit NAICS Canadian
manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006.9 The sources of Canadian data are the
Annual Survey of Manufacturers (ASM) published by Statistics Canada, the Canadian
Socioeconomic Information Management (CANSIM) Database, the Bank of Canada. The
US data are obtained from the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) published by the
US Census Bureau, and the Basic Economics database (DRI/McGraw-Hill).
The empirical speciﬁcation is
푑푙푛(푝푟표푑푢푐푡푖푣푖푡푦)푖푡 =
훽0 + 훽1 ⋅ 푑푙푛(푒푥푐ℎ푎푛푔푒 푟푎푡푒)푡−1 + 훽2 ⋅ 푐표푛푐푒푛푡푟푎푡푖표푛푖푡−1
+ 훽3 ⋅ 푑푙푛(푒푥푐ℎ푎푛푔푒 푟푎푡푒)푡−1 ⋅ 푐표푛푐푒푛푡푟푎푡푖표푛푖푡−1
+ 훽4 ⋅ 푑푙푛(푒푥푐ℎ푎푛푔푒 푟푎푡푒)푡−1 ⋅ 푐표푛푐푒푛푡푟푎푡푖표푛푖푡−1 ⋅ 푇푟푎푑푒 퐷푢푚푚푦푖
+ 훽5 ⋅ (표푡ℎ푒푟 푐표푛푡푟표푙푠) + 푢푖 + 휖푖푡 (35)
where 푖 is the index for the industries and 푡 for year. 푢푖 is the industry speciﬁc eﬀect and
휖푖푡 is the error term assumed to be i.i.d. across industries and time.
In the speciﬁcation, I use last period exchange rate movement as a regressor. In the
theoretical model, at the beginning of the ﬁrst period ﬁrms decide whether to improve
productivity conditioned on the perfect foresight of an appreciation. While ﬁrms in the
real world do not possess perfect foresight, they can predict exchange rate by exploiting
the fact that the deviation of exchange rate from the PPP value is highly persistent.10 An
appreciation in the last period is a good predictor that the current period exchange rate
will stay at an appreciated level. According to my calculation, for the Canadian dollar/US
dollar exchange rate, the correlation coeﬃcient between the deviation from PPP and its
9The total number of 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries is 262. 25 industries are missing from
the sample due to the lack of data.
10See Rogoﬀ (1996) for a discussion of the persistence in deviation from PPP.
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one-period lag is 0.887. Hence, I used the last period exchange rate movement to capture
the ﬁrms’ expectation about exchange rate in the current period.
The interaction between exchange rate and concentration corresponds to the model
prediction, that in general, there is a positive relation between market concentration and
productivity growth during appreciations. The triple interaction term reﬂects the model
prediction that, during an appreciation, market concentration level is positively associated
with productivity gain within the group of highly traded industries. Since an appreciation
is deﬁned as a decrease in the exchange rate, a negative 훽4 would support the prediction.
The traditional measure of productivity, total factor productivity (TFP), is not
available for Canadian manufacturing industries as Statistics Canada does not provide
data on capital stock or investment necessary for the computation of TFP. Thus I use
labor productivity instead, and the main measure is value added per production worker.
In robustness checks I also explore manufacturing revenue per production worker as an
alternative measure of labor productivity. Value added per production worker is often
used to measure labor productivity in the international trade literature, for instance in
Bernard and Jensen (1999). Treﬂer (2004) uses “value added in production activities per
hour worked by production workers” as the measure for productivity. While the analysis
of Treﬂer (2004) is based on the 3-digit SIC manufacturing industries, this paper is based
on 6-digit NAICS classiﬁcation of industries. As the hours worked are not reported by
Statistics Canada for the 6-digit NAICS industries, it is not possible for this paper to use
the same measure.
The measure of exchange rate is the Canadian-dollar eﬀective exchange rate index
(CERI) created by the Bank of Canada. It is deﬁned by the Bank of Canada as “a
weighted average of bilateral exchange rates for the Canadian dollar against the currencies
of Canada’s major trading partners”11. Since the US dollar carries a weight of 0.7618, the
11These currencies are the US dollar, the European Union euro, the Japanese yen, the UK
pound, the Chinese yuan, and the Mexican peso. Details can be found at http://www.bank-banque-
canada.ca/en/rates/ceri.pdf.
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movement of the CERI closely mimics the movement of the Canada/US exchange rate, as
shown in Figure 2.5. I deﬂate the CERI by the inﬂation rate in Canada and the weighted
inﬂation rate of the major trading partners to obtain movements in real exchange rate. 12
The concentration of production in each industry is measured by the 4-ﬁrm concen-
tration ratio (CR4) reported by Statistics Canada. In the model ﬁrms are symmetric, so
CR4 has an inverse relation with the number of ﬁrms in the industry. In reality ﬁrms
diﬀer in size so CR4 might be a better measure of concentration compared to the number
of ﬁrms 13. Since data on CR4 is not available beyond 2003, I use the 2003 values for the
years 2004 and 200514.
Trade costs of industries are not observed but in the model they have an inverse
relation with the trade to sales ratio. I construct the ratio for an industry as the value of
total import plus export divided by the manufacturing revenue of the industries between
1997 and 2006.
Other control variables included in the regressions are growth in energy per pro-
duction worker, growth in material per production worker, growth in R&D expenditure,
average establishment size, productivity growth in corresponding US industry, and GDP
growth in Canada and the US. Lastly, industry ﬁxed eﬀects and year eﬀects are also used
in most of the regressions.
As mentioned before, there are no direct measures of the capital stock, its utilization
variation, and changes in hours worked per worker. Including energy and material use
provides a limited remedy. The model in the paper focuses on the adoption of a known
12In unreported regressions, I use the Canada/US real exchange rate and ﬁnd results are not sensitive
to this treatment.
13CR4 is used by MacDonald (1994) to study how the change in productivity varies with market power
after an import surge. This paper is similar in that it also studies how the eﬀect of competition diﬀers
with cross section diﬀerence in CR4.
14Note CR4 enters the regression model with a one-period lag. Using 2003 values for the year of 2004
and 2005 does not have a major impact on the results, since CR4 is stable over time (see Table 1) and
most of the variation in CR4 comes from the cross-section. In the robustness check subsection, I show the
main results hold even if I use the 1990 CR4 values as the measure for concentration between 1997 and
2006.
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technology, and the inclusion of R&D expenditure helps to control for the improvement to
productivity due to ﬁrms’ search for new technologies. However, R&D is available only for
3-digit or 4-digit NAICS industries, at a higher level of aggregation than 6-digit NAICS
industries. Average establishment size is computed as the number of production workers
per establishment in an industry. It is included to control for return-to-scale eﬀects. Since
it is possible for Canadian industries to beneﬁt from technological spillover from foreign
industries, especially US industries, I include productivity growth in the corresponding
US industry to capture such learning opportunities. Adding real GDP growth rates of
Canada and US will control for the eﬀects of macroeconomic productivity and demand
shocks.
Before turning to regression results, it is useful to have a brief look at a number of key
variables during the depreciation sub-period (1997-2002) and the appreciation sub-period
(2002-2006) in Table 1.
We can see that during appreciation export growth and employment of produc-
tion workers dropped. Meanwhile, Canadian manufacturing labor productivity, measured
by both value added per production worker and manufacturing revenue per production
worker increased, although it was outpaced by US labor productivity growth. Judging
from the means reported, we cannot rule out the possibility that the higher labor pro-
ductivity growth in Canada had come from spillover from the 5.2% growth in US labor
productivity. It could also be the case that higher energy use per production worker con-
tributed to the labor productivity growth. Growth in R&D expenditures and scale eﬀects
as measured by establishment sizes, on the other hand, appear to be poor explanations
for the higher productivity growth in the appreciation sub-period, as the two variables




I estimate all speciﬁcations with the linear model with industry ﬁxed eﬀects. The only
complication comes from the threshold eﬀect of trade. Conditioned on whether trade
exceeds a threshold level, the model predicts diﬀerent relations between concentration of
production and productivity gain during appreciation. The trade threshold is unknown
and has to be estimated. The estimation of the threshold follows Hansen (2000), and is
based on least-square regressions. I ﬁrst construct a grid of trade-ratios with the step
size being 0.5 of a centile and then search the grid for a threshold at which the eﬀect of
concentration-exchange-rate interaction changes signiﬁcantly. The estimated threshold is
located at the 83.5th centile, translating to a trade to revenue ratio of 1.89. There are
39 industries with a trade ratio above the threshold. The 95% conﬁdence interval for
the threshold is between the 76th and 92.5th centiles, or [1.63, 2.80] in terms of trade-
to-revenue ratio. Using the threshold estimate, I estimate the threshold regression model
speciﬁed in (35). Standard errors are computed with methods suggested in Hansen (2000).
Though not predicted by the theory, it is plausible that the eﬀect of exchange rate
on labor productivity growth may also change with a trade threshold. The application
of the threshold estimation method on the interaction between trade and exchange rate
movement indicates there is no statistically signiﬁcant threshold eﬀect15. In essence, I
have used the method in Hansen (2000) to guide the empirical speciﬁcation. In one of the
robustness checks, the interaction between the trade dummy and exchange rate movement
is included to show key results are insensitive to its inclusion.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 2 report the benchmark regression results. The
speciﬁcation in column (1) includes year dummies, thus precluding variables that are
invariant across the cross-section, in particular the last-period exchange rate movement.
Speciﬁcation (2) and (3) estimate the same speciﬁcation using only the subsamples.
15In unreported regressions, the interaction between trade-to-revenue ratio and other variables, such as
the concentration ratio, are also included as regressors. Such interactions are always highly insigniﬁcant.
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In column (1) of Table 2, the level of concentration ratio is not signiﬁcant, consistent
with the theory prediction that it should not matter independent of the exchange rate.
The interaction between concentration and exchange rate is negative and signiﬁcant, with
a coeﬃcient of -0.009. This estimate implies that during a 5% appreciation16 an industry
with a 20% higher concentration ratio will experience labor productivity growth that is
0.9% higher. Since the average labor productivity growth rate between 1997 and 2006 was
1.4%, and that the standard deviation of the concentration ratio was 24%, we can say this
is an economically signiﬁcant eﬀect. Meanwhile, the coeﬃcient on the triple interaction of
exchange rate, concentration and trade dummy is -0.005, which is economically large but
not statistically signiﬁcant.
The growth rate in R&D expenditure appears to have had no eﬀect on labor pro-
ductivity growth. While the establishment size did have an impact on labor productivity
growth, the magnitude was not big as a coeﬃcient of 0.004 meant that an increase of
establishment size by 100 workers only raised labor productivity growth by 0.04.%17 The
coeﬃcient on the energy and material variables suggest that the energy and material elas-
ticity of productivity are 0.199 and 0.250 respectively. Both are highly signiﬁcant. Lastly,
the labor productivity growth in Canadian industries was positively correlated with the
growth in US. A 1% increase in productivity in a US industry is associated with a 0.159%
increase in the corresponding Canadian industry.
Column (2) is estimated with the subsample between 2002 and 2006, i.e. the ap-
preciation period, while column (3) is estimated with the subsample of the depreciation
period. The discussion will be focused on the interaction terms, as estimates of other
coeﬃcients are similar to column (1). In column (2), the interaction between concentra-
tion and exchange rate becomes insigniﬁcant while the triple interaction term becomes
signiﬁcant. A coeﬃcient of -0.011 on the triple interaction term implies that during a 5%
16Note again, appreciation is deﬁned as decrease in the exchange rate.
17The unit of measurement for establishment is scaled up to 10 workers to facilitate the presentation of
results, i.e. to avoid many fractions with four digits after the decimal point.
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appreciation an industry with a 20% higher concentration ratio will experience a labor
productivity growth that is 1.1% higher. The estimates are in line with the predictions
of the theory, i.e. we expect to see a positive correlation between concentration and la-
bor productivity growth only for the high-trade industries.18 On the other hand, the
estimation on the depreciation subsample indicates no threshold eﬀect and the eﬀect of
concentration-exchange-rate interaction is large but not statistically signiﬁcant.19
It is worth noting that most of the variation in concentration ratio comes from
the cross-section, rather than variation in the time dimension. Over the sample period,
98% of the variance in concentration is accounted for by the variance in the industry
average concentration ratio. Namely, within most industries, the concentration levels had
experienced very little change. Therefore, in interpreting the results, we can roughly view
the concentration level as ﬁxed over time and regard the regression coeﬃcients on the
concentration-exchange-rate interactions as reﬂection of the diﬀerent eﬀects of exchange
rates movements on industries with diﬀerent pre-determined concentration levels.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, I conduct several robustness checks. Table 3 reports the results with
alternative dependent variables. The dependent variable in columns (1) through (3) is
the diﬀerence between Canadian and US labor productivity growth rates. Adopting this
dependent variable is equivalent to imposing the restriction that the coeﬃcient on US
productivity growth is 1 in the regressions in Table 2. Careful comparison between the
ﬁrst three columns of Table 3 and Table 2 suggests they are very similar. In the last
18Fernandes (2007) ﬁnds that when faced with the competitive presure of trade liberalization, there
were bigger productivity gains for plants in less competitive Colombian manufacturing industries. While
working on a diﬀerent type of competitive pressure, my ﬁndings about productivity and market power are
consistent with hers.
19In Fung and Liu (2009), the authors ﬁnd that productivity of Taiwanese ﬁrms actually increased during
the depreciation of the New Taiwan dollar in late the 1990s. They suggest the increase may be due to the
larger scale of production after depreciation. Both my theoretical and empirical results do not add new
evidence on the relation between depreciation and productivity.
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three columns, the dependent variable is manufacturing revenue per production worker,
arguably a poorer measure for labor productivity not accounting for costs of other inputs.
Although the overall ﬁt of the three regressions are much better, we can only ﬁnd a weak
relation between concentration and labor productivity growth and there is no evidence of
a threshold eﬀect.
In the baseline estimations, I look at the eﬀect of exchange rate change between
year 푡 − 1 and 푡 on productivity growth between 푡 and 푡 + 1. Since in their decision-
making, ﬁrms may look into exchange rate change over a longer period in the past, and
the change in productivity may realize over a longer period too, I also estimate equations
with alternative assumption about the length of periods. In Table 4, the ﬁrst three columns
present eﬀects of exchange rate change between 푡− 2 and 푡 on productivity between 푡 and
푡+ 2. The last three columns are eﬀects of exchange rate change between 푡− 3 and 푡 on
productivity between 푡 and 푡 + 1. While there are some changes in parameter estimates,
the coeﬃcients on the triple interaction term for the appreciation period are very similar
to the benchmarks in 2.
After a major appreciation, productivity can improve due to ﬁrms upgrading their
technologies, as suggested in this paper. However, productivity increase can also result
from exits of less eﬃcient ﬁrms. In Table 5, I present results from speciﬁcations augmented
by change in the number of establishments. We can see the coeﬃcients on the interaction
terms are similar to the benchmarks. However, adding change in the number of estab-
lishments is a crude way to control for the eﬀect of entries and exits. Ideally one should
control for the size of entrants and exiting ﬁrms, but these data have not been available.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 6, I allow for an interaction between the trade
dummy and exchange rate movement, with the triple interaction absent in column (1).
This interaction is not always signiﬁcant. In column (1) we see a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
the concentration-exchange-rate interaction, and in column (2) there is a threshold eﬀect,
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signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Lastly, it is reasonable to suspect the concentration ratio may aﬀect labor produc-
tivity growth one period later via channels other than its interaction with the exchange
rate, for example, the consolidation of ﬁrms in the current period can raise concentration
and the resulting synergy can lead to productivity gains in the future periods. To show
that this suspicion is unlikely, I use CR4 in 1990 to interact with exchange rate movements
and trade between 1997 and 2006. In this case, only the lagged cross-section variation in
CR4 is used in estimation. The results are reported in column (3) of Table 6. We can still
see a positive relation between concentration and labor productivity growth, and a trade
threshold eﬀect, although the interaction terms are only signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
On the balance, the evidence suggest the appreciation provided incentive for Cana-
dian manufacturing industries to improve productivity. In particular, highly-concentrated
industries experienced higher labor productivity growth during an appreciation. On the
other hand, the theoretical model does not oﬀer a direct prediction for periods of de-
preciation, and the evidence during the 1997-2002 sub-period is inconclusive. Lack of
productivity responses during the depreciation sub-period could be due to that the depre-
ciation between 1997 and 2002 was too moderate to trigger responses from competitors of
Canadian ﬁrms.
5 Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the question of how productivity responds to major real ex-
change rate movements. Drawing on observations of disruptive technological changes
documented in Holmes et al. (2008), I have built a partial equilibrium model to clarify
how productivity responses of industries vary with trade costs and market concentration
during an appreciation. Similar to results in previous literature, I ﬁnd that competitive
pressure resulting from appreciations increases incentives to improve productivity, as the
34
appreciation lowers the proﬁt loss during costly transitions. Meanwhile, higher trade costs
reduce the incentives by diminishing the competitive pressure of appreciations. In ad-
dition, this paper contributes to the theoretical literature by studying the intensity of
technology adoption, suggesting a positive relation between market concentration and the
intensity of adoption. It is ﬁrms in highly concentrated industries that will invest more in
productivity improvements, as their marginal beneﬁts from adopting better technologies
are greater.
Empirical analysis of 237 6-digit Canadian manufacturing industries between 1997
and 2006 supports the theoretical model’s predictions. During the appreciation period
between 2002 and 2006, labor productivity growth was on average higher after controlling
for industry ﬁxed eﬀects, and growth in all of energy use, material use, R&D expenditure,
and productivity in corresponding US industries. Highly concentrated industries experi-
enced high productivity growth, conditional on their exposure to a substantial amount
of trade. The theoretical model does not oﬀer predictions for productivity response to
depreciations, and during the depreciation period between 1997 and 2002, there is little
empirical evidence that labor productivity growth had been correlated with exchange rate
movements or concentration. The empirical analysis adds to the evidence of a positive
relationship between competitive pressure and productivity improvement.
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Three ﬁrms in industry 푖′
There are two countries and both produce the same continuum of consumption goods indexed by 푖 with 푖 ∈ [0, 1]
at time periods 푡 = 1, 2. Every good is tradable subject to an iceberg trade cost 휏푖 for good 푖. In industry 푖 there
are 푛푖 home ﬁrms and 푛푖 foreign ﬁrms who produce good 푖. The home ﬁrms and foreign ﬁrms of industry 푖
produce with labor in their respective country, and sell their production in both countries. In each period, the
home and foreign ﬁrms of industry 푖 play a Cournot game in the home market to determine the quantities of good
푖 output. Similarly the same ﬁrms also compete in a Cournot game in the foreign market.













(1, 0) Optimal 휎
Π푗푖 (휎)−Π
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푖 (푠푞) is the beneﬁt of adopting technology of level 휎 and 퐼(휎) is the ﬁxed cost. For a given 휏푖, when




, foreign ﬁrms in industries with 푛 ﬁrms begin to
drop out of the market and home ﬁrms has a jump in proﬁt as they are competing only against each other. When




is not optimal and home ﬁrms will choose an interior 휎. For





. Firms in these industries will
choose interior 휎 as well as long as this is the case in the 푛-ﬁrm industry.









푖ℎ(푠푞) for 푛푖 = 푛
(1, 0)
Optimal 휎 for industry with 푛푖 = 푛
Π푗푖ℎ(휎)−Π
푗
푖ℎ(푠푞) for 푛푖 = 푛+ 1





(푠푞) is the beneﬁt of adopting technology of level 휎 and 퐼(휎) is the ﬁxed cost. Proposition 4 shows,
the beneﬁt of adoption for industries with 푛 ﬁrms is increasing faster in 휎 than industries with 푛+ 1 ﬁrms. Given
the same ﬁxed cost 퐼(휎), the optimal choice of 휎 for ﬁrms in industries with fewer ﬁrms is larger.
Figure 3: Illustration of The Relation between 푛푖 and Choice of 휎
푛푖
휎
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 b b b b b b b b
Choices of 휎 for industries with trade cost above 휏ˆ





bb bb bb b
The model suggests, 1) for industries with trade cost lower than 휏ˆ the choice of productivity improvement 휎 is
negatively correlated with the number of ﬁrms per industry 푛푖 , and 2) industries with trade cost greater than 휏ˆ
will not adopt the disruptive technology (denoted as choosing 휎 = 1 in the ﬁgure).
Figure 4: Level of Technology Adoption and Number of Firms in the Industry
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The solid line is the Canada/US nominal exchange rate and the dashed line is the Canadian-dollar eﬀective
exchange rate (CERI). Both are measured at annual frequency. Note the original CERI has a base value of 100
and is deﬁned as the price of Canadian dollar in terms of the basket of foreign currencies. To make it compatible
with the deﬁnition in the paper, I divide the original CERI by 100 and take the inverse. The dashed line plots the
edited CERI series.
Figure 5: Movements of Canadian Dollar Exchange Rate Since 1990
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Table 1: Means of Key Variables between 1997 and 2006
Whole period Depr(1997-2002) Appr(2002-2006)
dln(value added per production worker), CND 1.4% (0.39%) 1.0% (0.53%) 2.0% (0.56%)
dln(value added per production worker), US 3.0% (0.31%) 1.3% (0.42%) 5.2% (0.42%)
dln(revenue per production worker), CND 1.5% (0.29%) 0.6% (0.02%) 2.5% (0.39%)
dln(eﬀective exchange rate) -1.4% (4.9%) 1.6% (2.6%) -5.6% (4.4%)
trade to revenue ratio 1.39 (0.04) 1.36 (0.05) 1.43 (0.05)
4-ﬁrm concentration ratio 48.3% (0.52%) 48.3% (0.69%) 48.0% (0.80%)
dln(manufacturing revenue) 0.8% (0.31%) 2.3% (0.45%) -1.1% (0.43%)
dln(value of export) 0.9% (0.48%) 4.0% (0.73%) -3.0% (0.57%)
dln(value of import) 2.8% (0.44%) 4.2% (0.68%) 1.1% (0.49%)
dln(number of production workers) -0.7% (0.33%) 1.7% (0.43%) -3.7% (0.48%)
dln(R&D expenditure) 7.9% (0.36%) 12.3% (0.54%) 2.5% (0.79%)
dln(energy per production worker) 5.2% (0.37%) 2.7% (0.49%) 8.2% (0.55%)
dln(material per production worker) 1.5% (0.34%) 1.5% (0.45%) 1.6% (0.51%)
establishment size 60 (2.53) 66 (3.90) 52 (2.89)
Notes: 1) The numbers are the means of 237 6-digit NAICS industries over the time period indicated,
except for the case of R&D expenditure where the means are calculated from 4-digit NAICS industries.
2) “dln” denotes ﬁrst diﬀerences in log, as approximations for growth rates. 3) The numbers in the
parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 2: Benchmark Fixed Eﬀect Estimations
Dependent variable Full sample Appr. Depr.
dln(productivity) 1997-2006 2002-2006 1997-2002
퐶푅4 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 퐶푅4 -0.009** -0.005 -0.013
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 퐶푅4 ⋅ 푇푟푎푑푒퐷 -0.005 -0.011** 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
푑푙푛(푅&퐷) 0.002 -0.013 -0.018
(0.027) (0.046) (0.044)
퐸푠푡푎푏 푠푖푧푒 0.004*** 0.001 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0002)
푑푙푛(퐸푛푒푟푔푦) 0.199*** 0.106** 0.326**
(0.028) (0.040) (0.049)
푑푙푛(푀푎푡푒푟푖푎푙) 0.250** 0.207** 0.276**
(0.028) (0.039) (0.050)
푑푙푛(푃푟표푑푢푐푡푖푣푖푡푦 푈푆) 0.159** 0.223* 0.165
(0.074) (0.098) (0.151)
year dummies included included included
industry ﬁxed eﬀects included included included
푅2 0.11 0.09 0.10
Observations 2068 906 1162
Industries 237 231 237
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%.
2)“dln” denotes ﬁrst diﬀerences in log, as approximations for growth rates.
3) The dependent variable is labor productivity, measured as value added per production worker. RER, CR4,
TradeD, R&D, Estab size, Energy, Material, and Productivity US denote respectively real exchange rate, 4-ﬁrm
concentration ratio, a dummy variable for highly-trade industries, R&D expenditure, average establishment size,
energy used per production worker, material used per production worker, growth in value added per production
worker in the corresponding US industry.
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Table 3: Alternative Dependent Variables
Full sample Appr. Depr. Full sample Appr. Depr.
1997-2006 2002-2006 1997-2002 1997-2006 2002-2006 1997-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
퐶푅4 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 퐶푅4 -0.006* -0.002 -0.014 -0.003* -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 퐶푅4 ⋅ 푇푟푎푑푒퐷 -0.006* -0.013*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
푑푙푛(푅&퐷) 0.056** 0.073 0.020 0.002 0.040** -0.043
(0.027) (0.047) (0.044) (0.015) (0.019) (0.029)
퐸푠푡푎푏 푠푖푧푒 0.005*** 0.003 0.008*** 0.001* 0.002 0.002*
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.001)
푑푙푛(퐸푛푒푟푔푦) 0.207*** 0.092** 0.352*** 0.118*** 0.139*** 0.102***
(0.029) (0.042) (0.050) (0.015) (0.017) (0.032)
푑푙푛(푀푎푡푒푟푖푎푙) 0.238*** 0.211*** 0.252*** 0.584*** 0.536*** 0.637***
(0.029) (0.040) (0.050) (0.079) (0.016) (0.032)
푑푙푛(푃푟표푑푢푐푡푖푣푖푡푦 푈푆) - - - 0.079* 0.165*** -0.015
(0.041) (0.041) (0.099)
year dummies included included included included included included
industry ﬁxed eﬀects included included included included included included
푅2 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04
Observations 2068 906 1162 2068 906 1162
Industries 237 231 237 237 231 237
Notes:
1) ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%.
2)“dln” denotes ﬁrst diﬀerences in log, as approximations for growth rates.
3) The dependent variable in the ﬁrst three columns is the growth rates diﬀerence in Canada and US value added
per production worker.
4) The dependent variable in column (4) through (6) is manufacturing revenue per production worker.
5) RER, CR4, TradeD, R&D, Estab size, Energy, Material, and Productivity US denote respectively real exchange
rate, 4-ﬁrm concentration ratio, a dummy variable for highly-trade industries, R&D expenditure, average
establishment size, energy used per production worker, material used per production worker, growth in value
added per production worker in the corresponding US industry.
45
Table 4: Alternative Speciﬁcation of Lags
Dependent variable Full sample Appr. Depr. Full sample Appr. Depr.
dln(productivity) 1997-2006 2002-2006 1997-2002 1997-2006 2002-2006 1997-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
퐶푅4 -0.001 -0.007* -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 퐶푅4 -0.005 0.002 -0.011 0.001 0.002 -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 퐶푅4 ⋅ 푇푟푎푑푒퐷 -0.005 -0.011*** 0.013 -0.004** -0.008*** 0.019*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.013)
푑푙푛(푅&퐷) 0.003 0.073 -0.038 0.008 -0.015 0.023
(0.024) (0.042) (0.043) (0.017) (0.028) (0.041)
퐸푠푡푎푏 푠푖푧푒 0.001*** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.003** -0.001 0.001***
(0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0002)
푑푙푛(퐸푛푒푟푔푦) -0.022 -0.014 -0.067 0.057*** 0.037 0.161***
(0.031) (0.046) (0.054) (0.022) (0.030) (0.049)
푑푙푛(푀푎푡푒푟푖푎푙) 0.103*** -0.033 0.191*** 0.089*** 0.010 0.197***
(0.031) (0.047) (0.053) (0.021) (0.031) (0.048)
푑푙푛(푃푟표푑푢푐푡푖푣푖푡푦 푈푆) 0.299*** 0.408*** 0.441** 0.188** 0.253*** 0.200
(0.097) (0.125) (0.076) (0.097) (0.160)
year dummies included included included included included included
industry ﬁxed eﬀects included included included included included included
푅2 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.04
Observations 1818 903 915 2048 906 1162
Industries 237 233 235 239 231 237
Notes:
1) ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%.
2)“dln” denotes ﬁrst diﬀerences in log, as approximations for growth rates.
3) The dependent variable in the ﬁrst three columns is productivity growth rate in Canada between year 푡 and
푡+ 2. All independent variables are also measured between 푡 and 푡+ 2, except for that RER measures the
exchange rate change between 푡− 2 and 푡.
4) In column (4) through (6) is manufacturing revenue per production worker, the dependent variable and all
independent variables are measured between year 푡 and 푡+ 1, except for that RER measures the exchange rate
change between 푡− 3 and 푡.
5) RER, CR4, TradeD, R&D, Estab size, Energy, Material, and Productivity US denote respectively real exchange
rate, 4-ﬁrm concentration ratio, a dummy variable for highly-trade industries, R&D expenditure, average
establishment size, energy used per production worker, material used per production worker, growth in value
added per production worker in the corresponding US industry.
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Table 5: Eﬀects of Entry and Exit of Establishments
Dependent variable Whole sample Appr. Depr.
dln(labor productivity) 1997-2006 2002-2006 1997-2002
(1) (2) (3)
퐶푅4 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 퐶푅4 0.005 -0.006 -0.012
(0.003) (0.004) (0.010)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 퐶푅4 ⋅ 푇푟푎푑푒퐷 -0.005 -0.011*** -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
푑푙푛(푅&퐷) 0.011 -0.012 0.002
(0.027) (0.046) (0.043)
퐸푠푡푎푏 푠푖푧푒 0.001*** 0.001 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.002)
푑푙푛(퐸푛푒푟푔푦) 0.197*** 0.100** 0.319***
(0.028) (0.040) (0.048)
푑푙푛(푀푎푡푒푟푖푎푙) 0.242*** 0.216*** 0.244***
(0.028)* (0.039) (0.049)
푑푙푛(푃푟표푑푢푐푡푖푣푖푡푦, 푈푆) -0.854*** -0.785*** -0.812***
(0.075) (0.093) (0.156)
푑푙푛(퐸푠푡푎푏푙푖푠ℎ푚푒푛푡푠) -0.005 0.062** -0.107***
(0.020) (0.025) (0.039)
year dummies excluded excluded included
industry ﬁxed eﬀects included included included
푅2 0.16 0.15 0.13
Observations 2068 906 1162
Industries 237 231 237
Notes:
1) ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%.
2)“dln” denotes ﬁrst diﬀerences in log, as approximations for growth rates.
3) The dependent variable is labor productivity, measured as value added per production worker. RER, CR4,
TradeD, R&D, Estab size, Energy, Material, Productivity US, Establishments denote respectively real exchange
rate, 4-ﬁrm concentration ratio, a dummy variable for highly-trade industries, R&D expenditure, average
establishment size, energy used per production worker, material used per production worker, growth in value
added per production worker in the corresponding US industry, and the number of establishments.
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Table 6: Other Robustness Checks
Dependent variable Whole sample Whole sample Whole sample
dln(labor productivity) 1997-2006 1997-2006 1997-2006
(1) (2) (3)
퐶푅4 -0.001 -0.001 -
(0.001) (0.001)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 퐶푅4 -0.010*** -0.006 -0.007*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 푇푟푎푑푒퐷 -0.153 0.555 -
(0.191) (0.444)
푑푙푛(푅퐸푅) ⋅ 퐶푅4 ⋅ 푇푟푎푑푒퐷 - -0.014* -0.006*
(0.008) (0.003)
푑푙푛(푅&퐷) 0.002 0.002 -0.009
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
퐸푠푡푎푏 푠푖푧푒 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
푑푙푛(퐸푛푒푟푔푦) 0.200*** 0.198*** 0.167***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
푑푙푛(푀푎푡푒푟푖푎푙) 0.250*** 0.250*** 0.269***
(0.028)* (0.028) (0.030)
푑푙푛(푃푟표푑푢푐푡푖푣푖푡푦, 푈푆) 0.158** 0.157** 0.162**
(0.074) (0.074) (0.076)
year dummies excluded excluded included
industry ﬁxed eﬀects included included included
푅2 0.11 0.11 0.10
Observations 2068 2068 1987
Industries 237 237 224
Notes:
1) ***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%.
2)“dln” denotes ﬁrst diﬀerences in log, as approximations for growth rates.
3) The dependent variable is labor productivity, measured as value added per production worker. RER, CR4,
TradeD, R&D, Estab size, Energy, Material, and Productivity US denote respectively real exchange rate, 4-ﬁrm
concentration ratio, a dummy variable for highly-trade industries, R&D expenditure, average establishment size,
energy used per production worker, material used per production worker, and growth in value added per
production worker in the corresponding US industry.
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